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The 2011 Scottish Conservative Party Leadership Election: Dilemmas for 
Statewide Parties in Regional Contexts 
 
Abstract: The 2011 Scottish Conservative leadership election presented the party 
with two radically different visions for the future. The Scottish Conservatives rejected 
Murdo Fraser‟s plan to create a new independent Scottish party of the centre-right and 
elected Ruth Davidson, who promised to reform the party within the UK Conservative 
Party. The Conservatives‟ rejection of a radical break with the past suggests they will 
continue along a path of incremental change and supports an institutionalist analysis 
of party adaptation to devolution. This article explores why Davidson won and 
examines some of the implications for the Scottish and UK Conservative parties. The 
centre-periphery tension played out during the campaign is a dilemma for all 
territorial branches of statewide parties but poses especially difficult problems for the 
Conservatives because of the tension between unionist and centre-right agendas. 
 
 
The territorial branches of statewide parties face an acute dilemma in deciding how 
far to accommodate regional demands for autonomy. There is a tension between their 
belief in maintaining the integrity of the state and their desire to be seen as champions 
for regional issues. This tension is played out not only in terms of policy and 
candidate selection, but also in terms of the structure of regional parties themselves 
(Hopkin, 2009; Thorlakson, 2009). Roller and Van Houten (2003) have summed up 
the challenges facing the regional branches of statewide parties as the 
„regional/national dilemma‟. In this regard the 2011 Scottish Conservative Party 
leadership election unexpectedly turned into one of the most interesting contests in 
post-devolution Scotland. 
Having failed for years to unite around a coherent response to the challenge of 
devolution, the Scottish Conservatives were presented in September 2011 with two 
radically different visions for the future of their party. They could either remain a part 
of the UK Conservative Party or break away to form a new Scottish party of the 
centre-right under the leadership of Murdo Fraser. His plan generated interest from 
across the UK and set the agenda for most of the campaign. This article seeks to 
explain why in the end this plan was narrowly rejected, resulting in the relatively 
inexperienced Ruth Davidson winning the contest. In so doing it explores how the 
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„regional/national dilemma‟ came to the fore during the campaign and presents the 
Scottish Conservatives as an interesting case of a party wrestling with the challenges 
of being a statewide and regional actor. 
It begins by sketching an analytical framework for viewing the behaviour of 
statewide parties in regional contexts. It then analyses the autonomy and 
organisational structure of the Scottish Conservative Party and its electoral and 
political context in 2011. An examination of the candidates and their platforms notes 
the deep split over the issue of the constitution: both of the party and the United 
Kingdom. Analysis of the campaign itself emphasises these tensions and notes how 
the constitutional question came to the fore in the absence of major policy differences 
or ideological splits. The closeness of the result and irreconcilable constitutional 
views suggest that this leadership election did not draw a line under fundamental 
debates about the future direction of the Scottish Conservative Party. This leadership 
election had the potential to be a „critical juncture‟ in which radical change could 
have been adopted, but instead the Scottish Conservatives have opted to continue with 
the incremental institutional change which has characterised most UK parties‟ 
adaptation to regional devolution (Fabre, 2008; Bratberg, 2009). 
This case highlights wider problems of party management and identity for 
regional branch parties in dealing with the tension between regional identity and 
commitment to the central state. Does a more flexible and autonomous regional 
structure suggest a dilution of commitment to territorial integrity or does it represent a 
pragmatic approach to the challenges of multi-level politics? 
 
Adapting to the regional/national dilemma 
The strategy and behaviour of the regional branches of statewide parties is the subject 
of increasing academic interest (Hopkin and Van Houten, 2009). Regional branches 
of statewide parties often have difficult choices to make when it comes to their 
policies and organisation in a multi-level context. They need to strike a balance 
between overall coherence and regional identity. The extent of their adaptation to the 
sub-national environment is affected by a number of factors. 
 Firstly, party strategy may be affected by the nature of party competition at the 
regional level. If a region has a strong sense of identity, this may affect the regional 
party system and play a part in determining how much it diverges from the statewide 
one. The presence of strong regionalist parties and a divergent sub-national party 
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system require parties to more explicitly consider issues of regional and party 
autonomy and identity, although it may not automatically lead to more autonomous 
regional parties (Roller and Van Houten, 2003: 5). However, where regional elections 
are more strongly affected by the statewide context this may also affect the strategy 
adopted. For instance, Fabre (2008: 325) finds that the Spanish statewide parties tend 
to organise all of their regional branches in the same manner, regardless of whether 
particular regions have strong nationalist identities and movements. In contrast, in the 
UK, where regional elections are not considered to have a great effect on the 
statewide political system, greater regional autonomy is more likely. 
 Secondly, parties‟ adaptation to regional distinctiveness may be influenced by 
the constitution of the state. Generally we might expect that regions with greater 
powers will have more autonomous branches of statewide parties. Swenden and 
Maddens (2009: 257) conclude that for the most part this is the case, but note that „the 
effect of decentralisation does not play out uniformly across all statewide party 
organizations and may not manifest itself immediately.‟ The effect of regional power 
distribution will also depend on how a federal or quasi-federal state is organised 
(Deschouwer, 2003: 221-222; Thorlakson 2009: 158). 
 Thirdly, strategies of adaptation may be affected not only by practical 
considerations, but also by a party‟s history, ideology and internal dynamics 
(Panebianco, 1988; Hopkin and Bradbury, 2006). Institutional „stickiness‟ and inertia 
often prevent parties from responding to new electoral arenas in an optimal way. 
What to a political scientist may appear to be a „rational‟ response to new electoral 
circumstances may be ignored in favour of the status quo simply because internal 
change is too difficult (Hopkin, 2003: 228). Similarly, a party‟s ideological outlook 
may affect how it perceives the need to adapt to regional variations. Fabre (2008: 326) 
notes that the more centralised structures of the Partido Popular in Spain are a product 
of its history and views about devolution to the autonomous communities. Similarly, 
the unique history of the Scottish Conservative Party as the highly autonomous 
Scottish Unionist Party before 1965 has affected its present situation. 
 Finally, regional parties may be affected by being in government in one or 
more territorial levels (Hopkin 2003: 234). Being in opposition seems to make parties 
tend towards supporting more regional autonomy. Statewide parties may wish to use 
greater regional autonomy as a means to gain the support needed to return to power at 
national level. Whilst in opposition statewide parties may also be less concerned if 
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their regional branches decline to support statewide party policies (Roller and Van 
Houten, 2003: 8; Fabre, 2008: 325). 
The eventual party strategy shaped by these factors is expressed through a 
party‟s attitude towards its regional organisation, autonomy and policy. Parties must 
decide how much autonomy to give their regional branches over issues like candidate 
selection, leadership selection, finance and policy-making (Laffin et al., 2007: 90-92). 
This involves a delicate process of managing factions and interests to achieve a 
workable, and politically successful, relationship. 
In terms of policy, the most important question is the constitution and attitudes 
towards further regional autonomy. The party‟s policy on this question may have to 
be decided as a result of negotiation between the regional and statewide party. 
However, policy on domestic issues is just as important. For instance, whilst a 
measure of policy-making autonomy over areas of regional competence is desirable 
for sub-national parties, statewide parties tend to be mindful of the potential party 
programme incoherence that can occur as a result. There is a tension between 
tailoring policies to suit local needs and party competition on the one hand, and 
maintaining a strong national party identity on the other (van Houten, 2009; Carty, 
2004). Policy divergence poses awkward questions for the both the party‟s core and 
its regions. 
In terms of organisational autonomy, statewide parties must decide how far to 
allow regional parties to select their own candidates and leader. The UK Labour 
Party‟s attempts to interfere in leadership selection in Wales are widely held to have 
been counter-productive (Hopkin and Bradbury 2006: 141). The statewide party must 
also decide upon appropriate funding arrangements. If the regional party is financially 
self sufficient, then we might expect it to have more of a say on other matters. If, 
however, it relies on the statewide party for funding, then we might expect that the 
statewide party will demand something in return and exert more influence over policy. 
In terms of party organisation for regional branches of statewide parties, 
Roller and Van Houten (2003: 6) suggest four potential „ideal type‟ approaches: 
firstly, breaking away completely from the statewide party to form a regional party; 
secondly, adopting decentralising reforms of the statewide party to cope with the 
regional challenge; thirdly, ploughing on with the existing structures despite regional 
devolution; or, fourthly, further centralising party structures to pursue a more 
coordinated approach to regionalist party competition. UK political parties have in the 
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main opted for the second approach and have decentralised their existing structures to 
mirror the devolved parts of the country. 
However, Bratberg (2009) finds that the nature of this change in the UK does 
not follow strictly functional pressures. Rather it might better be explained by an 
institutionalist approach which emphasises the importance of party legacies, 
organisations and incremental change. Similarly, in her study of the UK and Spain, 
Fabre (2008: 326) notes that „parties and their leaders remain crucial actors in 
processes of party change and that parties do not simply react to environmental 
changes.‟ 
For Bratberg (2009), the UK‟s devolution reforms do not represent a „critical 
juncture‟ which forces a substantial break with the past. However, he does suggest 
that more radical reform „is typically preconditioned by a window of opportunity 
which may open in the wake of electoral failure‟ (Bratberg 2009: 77). The Scottish 
Conservatives‟ consistently poor electoral performance had the potential to make the 
2011 leadership election such a focus for a more substantial reform of party structures. 
In Murdo Fraser‟s words, the party was „fed up of losing‟ (Fraser, 2011). 
 
Territorial organisation in the Conservative Party 
In 2011 the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party was a territorial branch of the 
statewide UK Conservative Party (Deschouwer, 2003: 220). However, until 1965 the 
Scottish Conservatives were a distinct political party, the Scottish Unionist Party, 
which had a link to the UK Conservative Party more akin to that between the 
statewide CDU and Bavarian CSU in Germany. The Scottish Unionist Party itself was 
a coalition of different groups. In local government, for instance, many Scottish 
Unionists stood as Progressives in the 1950s (Seawright, 2002: 80). At the 1955 
general election, in which the Unionists won 50.1% of the vote in Scotland, many of 
its candidates stood as National Liberals. 
 At the beginning of 2011 the organisational structure of the Scottish 
Conservatives reflected the changes recommended in the report of the Strathclyde 
Commission (1998), chaired by Lord Strathclyde (now leader of the House of Lords). 
This united the professional and voluntary wings of the party under a single Scottish 
Conservative and Unionist Party, and provided for the new post of leader of the group 
of Members of the Scottish Parliament. Links with the UK party were maintained 
through the deputy chairman (elected by Scottish members) sitting on the statewide 
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Conservative Party board. Existing structures were thus adjusted and further 
decentralised to cope with the new devolved governance arrangements. 
 Despite being formally a part of the UK Conservative Party, the Scottish 
Conservatives enjoy considerable autonomy. Firstly, in terms of elite recruitment, the 
party selects its own candidates and leader. Unlike in the territorial Labour Party there 
have been no major instances of the statewide party explicitly attempting to influence 
leadership selection (Hopkin, 2009: 186-187). From 1998 until 2011 the only decision 
on personnel in the gift of the UK party leader was the appointment of the Scottish 
Conservative Party Chairman. Under reforms adopted in 2011, the Chairman will be 
appointed by the Scottish leader in consultation with the UK leader. In practice this 
has not been a controversial appointment; nor is there any evidence it has been used 
by the UK party to influence Scottish party decisions. 
Policies for devolved areas are formulated by the Scottish party without 
central interference. Where the Scottish Conservatives have taken a different policy 
position to their UK counterparts (for instance, over free personal care for the elderly 
in 2002) this has not tended to cause bitter arguments. As Fabre and Méndez-Lago 
(2009: 117) point out, much like the Partido Popular in Spain, the statewide 
Conservative Party „has not exerted the same degree of pressure on its regional 
branches, yet its regional branches have remained close to the party line.‟ This may in 
part be explained by the fact that for most of the period of devolution the 
Conservatives were not in power in the UK or Scotland. Significant freedom to decide 
on candidate selection and policy also reflects the previously quasi-detached history 
of the Scottish Conservatives. 
However, although the statewide Conservative Party has for the most part left 
the Scottish Conservatives to their own devices in terms of personnel and policy, the 
Scottish Party has come to rely heavily on financial support from London. This 
situation has changed since 2007 when the party in Scotland had enough money to 
finance itself (Bratberg, 2009: 70). In particular, Lord Laidlaw, a major funder of the 
party in Scotland, has withdrawn his support. The proposals of the Sanderson 
Commission (see below) can only be fully implemented with UK Conservative 
resources. The Commission concedes that „the UK Party will be required to meet all 
costs until the Scottish Conservatives achieve financial self-sufficiency‟ (Sanderson, 
2010: 40).  
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It is not yet clear how this financial dependence will affect other indicators of 
autonomy. However, it is not difficult to imagine circumstances where the UK Party 
could start to become frustrated if it is funding a Scottish branch which continues to 
struggle electorally and which may in future use its autonomy to support policies 
which place the UK party in an awkward position. In a situation of financial 
dependence there is the potential for subtle pressure to be applied behind the scenes. 
As Van Houten (2009: 149) suggests, the true extent of autonomy may only become 
apparent during moments of crisis. The statewide Conservative Party thus finds itself 
in the unhappy position of funding a territorial branch which neither contributes 
significantly to its aspiration of a majority in the statewide legislature (there is just 
one Scottish Conservative Member of the UK Parliament), nor acts as a major 
influence on territorial politics. 
 
Table 1 Indicators of autonomy for the Scottish Conservatives 
 2007 2011 
Leadership selection Decentralised Decentralised 
Candidate selection Decentralised Decentralised 
Policy-making Decentralised Decentralised 
Finance Decentralised Reliant on statewide party 
 
Following the disappointing results of the 2010 UK general election in which the 
Scottish Conservatives managed only to retain their one MP, a commission was 
established under the chairmanship of Lord Sanderson, a former Conservative 
minister and Scottish party chairman. It identified serious problems with the structure 
of the party and its final report recommended significant organisational changes, 
including for the first time the creation of the role of leader of the Scottish 
Conservative Party instead of simply leader of the group of MSPs. 
The Sanderson Commission considered but ruled out a change of name or a 
change in the relationship with the UK Conservative Party.  It noted that the Scottish 
Conservatives „obtain numerous benefits from being part of the UK party, including 
opportunity to access resources, training and expertise and for members to vote for 
the UK leader‟ (Sanderson, 2010: 14). Therefore „given the Conservative 
commitment to Scotland remaining within the United Kingdom, it is both appropriate 
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and beneficial that there should be an integrated relationship between the Scottish 
Conservatives and the UK party‟ (Sanderson, 2010: 15). 
A new Scottish Conservative Party constitution was drawn up to reflect 
Sanderson‟s conclusions and was adopted (with minor amendments relating to 
reviews for sitting candidates) at a special meeting of the party in Perth on 10 
September 2011. The leadership election of 2011 took place under the new rules 
recommended by Sanderson (2010: 16). Thus leadership candidates need not have 
been MSPs. This move towards a more explicitly separate Scottish Conservative 
Party with its own leader reflects another incremental institutional change. The 
Conservatives were still in 2011 adapting to the devolution reforms of 1999. 
 
Electoral context 
Since the high point of the 1955 the decline of the Conservatives in Scotland has been 
striking (Seawright, 1999). Its vote share has declined steadily and at the 1997 general 
election the Conservatives lost all of their seats in Scotland. At the 2010 general 
election, despite spending considerable sums of money on key targets seats, the 
Conservatives returned only one MP to Westminster from Scotland. In elections to the 
Scottish Parliament, the Conservative vote has also been in decline since 1999. The 
Conservatives‟ regional list vote share in the 2011 Scottish Parliament election was 
12.4%, down from 15.4% in 1999. This is the lowest share of the vote the Scottish 
Conservatives have received at a national parliamentary election. They have 15 MSPs, 
down from 18 in 1999. 
 This dismal performance has prompted unflattering comparisons with the 
Welsh Conservative Party. It, too, has had to deal with the Thatcher legacy and lost 
all of its seats in 1997 (Wyn Jones et al., 2002). However, it has since rebounded. It 
returned 8 MPs to Westminster in 2010 and has had a steadily increasing vote share 
and number of AMs in the Welsh Assembly. Although it must be remembered that the 
Welsh and Scottish party systems are very different, the comparison with Wales poses 
awkward questions for the Scottish Conservatives. 
 
Table 2 Scottish and Welsh Conservatives‟ performance at Westminster elections 
  
 Scottish Conservatives Welsh Conservatives 
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Number of 
MPs 
% share of 
vote 
Number of 
MPs 
% share of 
vote 
1992 11 25.6 6 28.6 
1997 0 17.5 0 19.6 
2001 1 15.6 0 21 
2005 1 15.8 3 21.4 
2010 1 16.7 8 26.1 
 
Sources: UK Parliament (1992); BBC News (1997; 2001; 2005; 2010) 
 
Table 3 Conservative performance at Scottish Parliament elections 
 
 % Regional 
vote 
Regional 
seats 
% 
Constituency 
vote 
Constituency 
seats 
Total seats 
1999 15.4 18 15.6 0 18 
2003 15.5 15 16.6 3 18 
2007 13.9 13 16.6 4 17 
2011 12.4 12 13.9 3 15 
 
Source: BBC News (1999; 2003; 2007; 2011) 
 
 
The 2010 general election performance was particularly humiliating for the 
Conservatives in Scotland. The Party spent considerable sums of money targeting 11 
key seats in Scotland. A high-profile new head of communications was recruited from 
Scottish Television to help with the campaign. Yet despite what they thought was an 
energetic and well-resourced effort, Conservative performance either stayed the same 
or, more worryingly, actually went into reverse. Indeed, in some of the top target seats 
in which the Conservatives spent a great deal of money, it did not seem to make any 
difference. David Cameron‟s final 24-hour road trip to key Conservative target seats 
included a visit to East Renfrewshire in Scotland, in which the sitting Labour MP 
actually increased his majority. It seemed that the more voters learned about the 
Scottish Conservative Party, the less they were inclined to vote for it. This was a 
sobering message for the party which could not easily be explained away. 
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 The rejection of the Conservatives in Scotland in 2010 also highlighted deeper 
constitutional issues. A potentially awkward situation about the appointment of a 
Secretary of State for Scotland was only avoided due to the coalition with the Liberal 
Democrats. As in the 1990s some members of the party worried that the Scottish 
Conservative Party‟s failure to recover was running increasingly serious risks with the 
union it was seeking to preserve. 
 
Political context 
In the 2007-2011 Scottish Parliament the Conservatives for the first time achieved 
some policy relevance by lending their support to the budgets of the minority SNP 
government. In return they received concessions from the government on police 
numbers and on a reduction in business rates. The party portrayed these as major 
achievements and they formed a significant part of its 2011 Scottish Parliament 
election campaign. A popular „town centre regeneration fund‟ demanded by the 
Conservatives also generated some positive media interest and suggested some 
(limited) imaginative thinking about a new type of Scottish Conservatism beyond 
toughness on crime and tax cuts.  
The Conservatives also played a useful role in setting the agenda for 
devolution under constrained public finances. In return for supporting the SNP‟s 2010 
budget, they insisted on an independent review of future budget scenarios, taking into 
account the reduction in Scotland‟s block grant from Westminster. The subsequent 
report by Crawford Beveridge was welcomed by all parties in the Parliament and 
generated for a period a serious discussion of policies and priorities in light of the 
coming austerity (Independent Budget Review, 2010). 
Nevertheless the overall political context for the Scottish Conservatives in 
2011 was not favourable. Despite returning to government in Westminster, their 
performance in Scotland at both the 2010 general election and the 2011 Scottish 
Parliament election was deeply disappointing for the party. The electorate did not 
reward the Scottish Conservatives for the concessions they secured from the SNP 
minority government. The relentless decline of the Conservatives in Scotland seemed 
to be continuing. Against this background, Annabel Goldie announced her resignation 
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from the leadership in May 2011, triggering the Scottish Conservatives‟ first-ever 
leadership election
1
. 
 
The candidates 
The campaign began with a low-key launch from Jackson Carlaw. Firmly rooted in 
the unionist right of the Party, he promised a more robustly unionist stance and 
distanced himself from both the Calman Commission and the approach taken towards 
the SNP under Annabel Goldie. Carlaw presented himself as „experienced, assured 
and unionist‟ and promised to fight against „separatists in all parties‟ (Carlaw, 2011). 
However, it was Fraser‟s campaign launch the following week that captured 
the attention of the media and of Conservatives from across the UK. He boldly 
declared that „there is no future for the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party in its 
current form‟ (Fraser, 2011). He proposed that the party be dissolved and reformed 
into a new Scottish party of the centre-right. This new entity would be entirely 
separate from the UK Conservative party but its MPs would take the Conservative 
whip at Westminster.  Fraser insisted his idea attracted broad support, and he was able 
at his campaign launch to introduce businessmen who claimed they would donate to a 
new centre-right Scottish Party. Fraser received the backing of a (bare) majority of 
Tory MSPs
2
 and of the party‟s only Member of the European Parliament, Struan 
Stevenson. The former Scottish Secretary Sir Malcolm Rifkind also supported 
Fraser‟s proposal for a new party. 
 His idea had been widely floated before either he or the Sanderson 
Commission considered it. Seawright (2002: 80) suggested that reviving the 
„Progressives‟ label which some Conservatives used in local government in the 1950s 
might be beneficial to the party. In 2007 The Spectator reported that the then UK 
Conservative Party Chairman, Francis Maude, and his team had been secretly drawing 
up plans for a „velvet divorce‟ from the Scottish Conservatives, involving the creation 
of a new and separate party in Scotland (The Spectator, 2007, 7 April). This plan 
received the endorsement of the influential grassroots Conservative Home website 
(Conservative Home, 2007). However, nothing subsequently came of this and it was 
                                                 
1
 The first leader of the Conservatives in the Scottish Parliament, David McLetchie, was elected in 
1998 by an electoral college, not by the members of the Party. Annabel Goldie was elected unopposed 
in 2005. 
2
 Elizabeth Smith MSP, David McLetchie MSP, Alex Fergusson MSP, Gavin Brown MSP, Jamie 
McGrigor MSP and Nanette Milne MSP, Alex Johnstone MSP. 
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unclear how serious the plans were or how far the party in Scotland had been 
consulted. Interestingly, after Fraser‟s announcement it also emerged that Nick 
Bourne, until 2011 the leader of the Conservatives in Wales, had briefly considered 
but rejected a change of name for the Welsh Conservative Party (Bourne, 2011). 
Welsh Conservative AM David Melding still supports this change (Melding, 2011). 
Nevertheless Fraser‟s intervention was the first time a senior Scottish party figure had 
discussed name change and separation publicly. Fraser was at pains to point out that 
his proposal merely returned the party to its original state before the 1965 reforms 
folded it more formally into the UK Conservative Party. 
 Ruth Davidson‟s campaign launch responded to Fraser‟s challenge. Davidson 
had entered the Scottish Parliament only two months previously. Described by the 
media as a lesbian who enjoys kick-boxing (see, for instance, Holyrood Magazine, 
2011), she came to prominence as the Conservative candidate in the Glasgow North 
East by-election in 2009 and was widely perceived as being close to Cameron and his 
brand of Conservative modernisation and „detoxification‟. She spent the previous year 
running Annabel Goldie‟s office in the Scottish Parliament.  
She declared her total opposition to Fraser‟s proposal which she felt was an 
unnecessary distraction from the real work at hand to rebuild the party from a 
grassroots level. Davidson‟s platform was based on a five-point plan to revitalise the 
party. This included a drive to attract new members and comprehensive party policy 
reviews (Davidson, 2011). Davidson was supported by two of the Scottish 
Conservatives‟ constituency MSPs, John Lamont and John Scott. She also had the 
support of former Scottish Secretary Lord Forsyth, who was highly critical of Fraser‟s 
plan. 
Margaret Mitchell‟s unexpected entry into the race at the last moment added 
another strong unionist candidate. She announced that she was standing because none 
of the other candidates represented her views, particularly with regard to the Scotland 
Bill. Alone among the candidates she was totally opposed to the further powers for 
the Scottish Parliament proposed in the Scotland Bill. She called for a referendum in 
which she would campaign for a „no‟ vote. Mitchell was also concerned that the party 
was looking inward when it should have been talking to ordinary voters.  
Mitchell‟s last-minute campaign and her diffident public performances failed 
to set the race alight. She was not perceived as having a chance of winning. However, 
her candidacy did bring more sharply into focus the other candidates‟ views on the 
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constitution. Her total opposition to the Scotland Bill also represented a significant 
strand of unionist thinking within the Party. 
 
Table 4 The candidates and the constitution 
 
Candidate Background Constitutional view 
Murdo Fraser • MSP since 2001 
• Shadow Cabinet 
Secretary for Health and 
Wellbeing 
• Deputy Leader since 
2005 
• Supporter of Scotland 
Bill and does not rule out 
future changes short of 
„full fiscal autonomy‟ 
Ruth Davidson • MSP since 2011 
• Candidate in Glasgow 
North East by-election, 
2009 
• Scotland Bill and no 
further 
Jackson Carlaw • MSP since 2007 
• Shadow Minister for 
Transport, Infrastructure 
and Climate Change 
• (reluctantly) Scotland 
Bill and no further 
Margaret Mitchell • MSP since 2003 
• Convenor of Equal 
Opportunities Committee, 
2007-2011 
• Referendum on Scotland 
Bill in which she would 
campaign for a no vote. 
 
There were thus broadly two visions for the future of the party presented to 
Conservative members. They could continue with their present party and a new leader 
(presumably attempting to emulate the success of the Welsh Conservatives) or take a 
much more radical interpretation of the realities of devolution and try to form a new 
Scottish party of the centre-right. By electing Davidson, they have opted for the least 
radical of the two directions offered to them. Instead of opting for a radical break with 
the past, they have chosen to continue with the incremental change proposed by the 
Sanderson Commission. 
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The campaign 
Fraser‟s radical suggestion set the agenda for much of the campaign. The three other 
candidates were forced to define their plans in relation to rejecting his proposal to 
break away. Members had the chance to question the candidates at a series of hustings 
meetings across Scotland. A broad consensus emerged on the need to improve 
structures within the party and procedures for supporting, training and selecting 
candidates and the Sanderson proposals were universally endorsed. For Fraser, they 
were a good first step; for the rest of the candidates those reforms alongside a new 
leader were as far as the party needed to go in order to recover. 
 Fraser struggled to answer questions about what he would do if he won and 
then had his plan for a new party rejected by the special conference he planned to call. 
This was a strong line of attack for the other candidates. They also pointed out that the 
Scottish Conservative Party risked being engaged in internal wrangling during the 
2012 local government elections and possibly at a future independence referendum. 
Both Davidson and Fraser found common ground on the idea of allowing the Church 
of Scotland to set up schools. However, in a moment which was perhaps symbolic of 
the public policy debate in Scotland and the Conservatives‟ place within it, the 
Church of Scotland appeared to reject the idea (The Scotsman, 2011, 20 September). 
An influential Scottish Tory „Party in the media‟ (Bale, 2010) does not exist to 
anything like the same extent as in England. Much of the support in the media for 
Fraser‟s plan elsewhere in the UK came from centre-right Scottish expats (for 
instance, Nelson, 2011). Conservative Home echoed its earlier support for a 
breakaway party (Montgomerie, 2011). Of Scotland‟s two quality daily newspapers, 
the centre-left Herald did not take a firm view. The more right-of-centre Scotsman 
was more sympathetic to the Fraser plan, but criticised him for not spelling out more 
clearly what a new party would entail (The Scotsman, 2011, 10 November). However, 
the Scottish edition of the Daily Telegraph was firmly opposed, describing Fraser‟s 
plan as „suicidal for the Union‟ (Daily Telegraph, 2011, 4 September). 
Allegations that the Scottish Party‟s central office was actively supporting 
Ruth Davidson caused acrimony and a lingering bitterness. The Party suspended its 
head of communications, Ramsay Jones, amid allegations that he was advising and 
helping the Davidson campaign, having attended a meeting at her home (The Herald, 
2011, 6 October). Other candidates‟ campaign teams suspected that Central Office 
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had supplied Davidson‟s team with private Conservative member mailing lists. The 
Party was forced to reject calls from the other candidates for an independent inquiry 
into whether Central Office in Edinburgh was supporting Ruth Davidson (The 
Scotsman, 2011, 19 October). Jones was reinstated after Davidson‟s election. 
Much of the debate also turned on the ability of the two frontrunners, 
Davidson and Fraser, to show that they had political and financial backing from 
significant figures associated with the party. When asked about the financial 
implications of a new Scottish Party, Fraser always insisted that it would be well 
funded. Potential new donors were introduced to members and the media at his 
campaign launch. However, one prominent donor, Jack Harvie, stood firmly behind 
Davidson and declared he would not fund a breakaway party. Such arguments among 
donors were a feature of the campaign and one prominent donor left as a result of 
Davidson‟s election. 
Ultimately the choice for Conservative members concerned two central 
factors: constitution and personality. All of the candidates were understandably light 
on policy proposals and specific questions about public policy did not dominate the 
campaign. Moreover, unlike, for instance, the 2005 UK Conservative party leadership 
election, there was no obvious significant left-right split among the candidates 
(Denham and Dorey, 2006: 36). Rather, it was the question of the constitution, both of 
the Conservative Party and the United Kingdom, which split the candidates and 
caused the most heated arguments during the campaign. At one end of the spectrum, 
Fraser proposed complete separation from the UK Conservatives and was „open 
minded‟ about further devolution to Scotland; at the other Mitchell wanted to 
maintain the link with the UK Conservatives and opposed even the Scotland Bill. 
Davidson and Carlaw both rejected the Fraser plan but viewed the Scotland Bill as a 
„line in the sand‟. 
Thus in the absence of major ideological or policy differences beyond the 
constitutional split, issues of personality became more prominent. Who would most 
likely lead the Scottish Conservatives to electoral success? In this regard Davidson 
may have had an advantage as the „counter-intuitive‟ candidate who associated herself 
publicly with Cameronism and the brand detoxification of the Conservatives. 
 
The results 
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The leadership election used the alternative vote system. The result was a close win 
for Ruth Davidson with Murdo Fraser behind. Carlaw and Mitchell did not come 
close to winning.  
 
Table 5 Leadership election results 
 
Total valid votes: 5676  Turnout: 63.4% 
 
Round 1 
Candidate Votes 
Ruth Davidson 2278 (40.1%) 
Murdo Fraser 2096 (36.9%) 
Jackson Carlaw 830 (14.6%) 
Margaret Mitchell 472 (8.3%) 
Margaret Mitchell eliminated. 
 
Round 2 
Candidate Votes 
Ruth Davidson 2469  (191 transferred from Margaret Mitchell) 
Murdo Fraser 2180 (84 transferred from Margaret Mitchell) 
Jackson Carlaw 980 (150 transferred from Margaret Mitchell) 
Non transferable 47 
Jackson Carlaw eliminated. 
 
Final Round 
Candidate Votes 
Ruth Davidson 2983 (514 transferred from Jackson Carlaw) 
Murdo Fraser 2417 (237 transferred from Jackson Carlaw) 
Non transferable 229 
Ruth Davidson wins. 
 
Source: Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party 
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It is apparent from the results that the majority of Carlaw and Mitchell‟s second 
preferences went to Davidson. Party members opposed to breaking away from the UK 
party used their other preferences to vote for candidates other than Fraser. This logic 
appears to have made it very hard for Fraser to win unless he won in the first round, 
or was sufficiently ahead of Davidson in the first round to counter-act the likely 
redistribution of second preferences. 
 Nevertheless Fraser‟s achievement in convincing so many members of the 
need for radical change is not insignificant. Fraser came within 200 votes of having 
the support from a majority of members to disband and reform the Scottish 
Conservative Party. The closeness of the result in this sense has wider future 
implications for the party. 
 Party elites were broadly happy with the way the leadership election was 
conducted. In particular, the clash of ideas contrasted favourably with the subsequent 
Scottish Labour Party leadership election which generated less interest. One 
leadership candidate reflected:  
I think what was extremely interesting about it was that our leadership 
election received more coverage and, I think, thoughtful public interest 
that the subsequent Labour Party election did. I mean, our party 
produced four candidates who had a distinct message. Clearly, Murdo‟s 
particular view made the Conservative Party leadership election of 
national interest… So, yes, I think it was very good for us because I 
think it demonstrated to the wider public that actually there was a 
debate going on in the Scottish Conservative Party about its future and 
that it had candidates who were credible in a contest (interview with the 
author, 10/04/2012). 
Similarly, commenting on debates about fiscal autonomy, another candidate noted 
that: „There were, if you like, three different approaches put before the electorate, so it 
was well aired‟ (interview with the author, 28/03/2012). Excluding some concerns 
during the campaign about the neutrality of Central Office, the contest, hustings and 
results were in the main viewed favourably by party elites. 
 
Implications for the Conservative Party 
Being a statewide party in a regional context presents everyday tactical and political 
tensions. A leadership contest in the wake of two disappointing elections and a 
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landslide victory for a nationalist party is likely to bring these tensions into sharp 
focus. For the Scottish Conservatives it provided a moment of flux in which very 
future of the party was openly discussed. This had the potential to be a „critical 
juncture‟ in which the radical change of Murdo Fraser‟s plan could have been adopted. 
However, this proved to be a step too far for the party membership who opted instead 
to evolve incrementally under the changes proposed by the Sanderson Commission. 
Davidson hinted at broad and sweeping changes but she has yet to articulate a 
radical plan to rejuvenate the party. One of her first moves as party leader was to 
appoint David Mundell, Scotland‟s only Tory MP, as interim chairman of the party. 
Since then, the „line in the sand‟ she drew during the leadership election regarding the 
powers in the Scotland Bill appears to have become more flexible. She said that she 
agreed with the Prime Minister‟s statement that further powers for the Scottish 
Parliament could be considered after the independence referendum. This apparent 
shift in her position towards a new UK party line after an announcement from the UK 
party leader may signal the imposition of a statewide strategy for the forthcoming 
Scottish independence referendum. 
In terms of the UK Conservative Party, David Cameron and his team must 
hope that this time the Scottish Conservatives have a strategy which will work. 
Winning a majority in 2015 without any increase in Tory seats in Scotland would put 
the Conservatives in a very awkward position. It is unclear how the relationship 
between London and Edinburgh will play out in this regard. However, given the 
continuing financial support from England which Sanderson (2011) notes will be 
required for some time to come, it is not certain that the statewide Conservative Party 
will continue with the mainly hands-off approach it has hitherto adopted towards 
Scotland. Can the statewide party leader continue to justify taking money from 
English associations and giving it to a regional branch which is failing to make 
progress? If the party‟s fortunes in Scotland continue to decline, then the temptation 
to intervene may become stronger. Some commentators have already attributed the 
shift in the Scottish Conservative Party‟s stance towards minimum alcohol pricing to 
pressure from the UK party (Monteith, 2012). 
 In general, the statewide Conservative party has not dealt well with territorial 
distinctiveness in the United Kingdom and has consistently been reactive when it 
comes to the constitution. The unique history of the Scottish Conservative Party has 
given it a high degree of autonomy across all areas. However, such freedom must now 
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be viewed alongside a lack of funds and consistently poor electoral performance. The 
embarrassing revelation in April 2012 that a Conservative Party treasurer had told an 
undercover reporter that the UK party was simply going through the motions in its 
commitment to unionism highlights a tension for the UK party (Scotland on Sunday, 
2012, 1 April). The independence of Scotland would deny the Labour Party 41 seats 
in the UK Parliament; the Conservative Party has just one Scottish MP. Those UK 
Conservatives who wish to maintain the union but bristle at the cost and lack of 
progress must, like all statewide parties, weigh the risk of intervention further eroding 
the electorate‟s perception of the party‟s commitment to regional distinctiveness. The 
national/regional dilemma exists in the Conservative party at both levels. 
 
The centre-right/unionist dilemma 
The Conservative Party faces the same challenges as any territorial branch of a 
statewide party in considering how far to adapt to the new circumstances without 
being seen to cede too much ground to the nationalists (Hopkin and Bradbury, 2006: 
140). The Scottish Labour Party went through a similar process at the same time as 
the Conservatives, culminating in the report by Jim Murphy and Sarah Boyack whose 
recommendations were along the same lines as the Sanderson Commission (Scottish 
Labour Party, 2011). 
 However, the constitutional arguments within the Scottish Conservative Party 
run much deeper. A strong centre-right case can be made for supporting much greater 
devolution to the Scottish Parliament. Indeed, an influential right-wing think-tank in 
Scotland advocates a strong measure of fiscal autonomy, reaching a situation where 
Scotland raised most of the taxes it spends (see, for instance, Reform Scotland, 2011). 
In the Scottish Conservative Party, this thinking clashes with a deeply felt 
commitment to the Union which views every new power for the Scottish Parliament 
as a concession to the SNP. Moreover, as Lynch (2011: 11-12) notes, there are still 
sections of the party which would rather the Scottish Parliament did not exist. Such 
attitudes prompted Michael Russell (currently the SNP Government‟s Education 
Secretary) and Dennis MacLeod to observe that the „Tories‟ problem is that their 
Unionist ideology is overcoming their free market common sense‟ (MacLeod and 
Russell, 2006: 130). These views are not fundamentally reconcilable and the 
closeness of the leadership election suggests this constitutional tension will continue 
into the future. The cloud that hangs over the leadership election in terms of the 
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allegations about the neutrality of Central Office in Edinburgh has not helped the 
Conservatives to heal divisions. 
 
Conclusion 
In his recent study of the Dumfries and Galloway Conservative Association, Smith 
(2011) concludes that the post-devolution Scottish Tories have been burying 
themselves in „banal activism‟ to avoid facing up to the deeper and more difficult 
questions about their future. At the very least the 2011 leadership election has allowed 
a reasonably frank and public airing of debates which were hitherto only conducted 
behind closed doors. Although the Scottish Tories have endured much disappointment 
and defeat, no senior Scottish Tory has until now taken the opportunity to spell out 
the challenges publicly. There has been no equivalent of Theresa May‟s hard-hitting 
„nasty party‟ conference speech; nor has there been evidence of a strong „Cameroon‟ 
faction in Scotland promoting radical detoxification and modernisation. The post-
devolution Conservatives have tended to avoid prolonged reflection on why they have 
performed so poorly. While the English and Welsh Conservatives have elected 
politicians who engage in public debates about the future of Conservatism (see, for 
instance, Evans, 2002; Vaizey et al., 2005; Melding, 2009), such forward thinking has 
been conspicuously lacking in Scotland. The Scottish Conservatives have generally 
preferred to muddle through, regardless of election results and developments sparked 
by colleagues elsewhere in the UK.  
However, having conducted a debate which many members and elites felt 
reflected well on the party, the Scottish Conservatives opted to continue along the 
path of adapting existing structures to better suit devolution and thereby presumably 
attributed their electoral problems to other factors. The „critical juncture‟ created by 
two significant electoral embarrassments has not been used to engineer a radical break 
with the past. Instead the result of this leadership election appears to be an example of 
the continuation of what Bratberg (2009: 75) refers to as „late and incremental reform‟. 
Conclusions about stability and gradual change in UK parties‟ adaptation to 
devolution are therefore supported by the outcome of this election. 
 Unlike other post-devolution UK party leadership elections, this one had at its 
heart a clash of ideas about how to deal with being a statewide party in a regional 
context. The proposals the candidates put before the electorate mirrored two of the 
choices Roller and Van Houten (2003: 6) suggest face the branches of statewide 
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parties in deciding how structure regional branches: adaptation and separation. 
However, beyond that debate, this election highlighted fundamental philosophical 
divisions about the future of the party which are now out in the open as never before. 
For the Scottish Conservatives, the usual „regional/national dilemma‟ faced by 
statewide parties is compounded by a clash between unionist and centre-right 
ideologies. 
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